The Impact of Internal Controls and Penalties on Fraud

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Little prior research exists on the parameters of internal control activities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002) makes identifying the properties of these parameters under various conditions important. In this paper, an analytical/reliability engineering methodology is used to investigate the relative impact of penalties versus other types of internal controls on managerial and non-managerial employees’ propensity to commit fraud. Ceteris paribus, increasing required effort with internal controls and/or increasing employee penalties, increases the minimum amount stolen when a fraud incident occurs; that is, more net assets will be taken per fraud incident with controls than without controls. The findings show that the firm’s least-cost scenario with managerial employees is to enforce maximum penalties. The firm’s least-cost scenario with non-managerial employees is to utilize alternative internal controls while imposing minimum penalties. Further, the effectiveness of separation of duties is dependent on the detective controls in the internal control system.