Affiliation:
1. University of Maryland College Park
Abstract
ABSTRACT
This paper replicates the results of the survey of experienced executives reported in Section IV of Seybert (2010). The survey data from the originally published article were retracted due to concerns about the source of the data (see Seybert 2015). I survey 79 experienced executives to elicit their beliefs about reputation-driven real earnings management. Participants indicate that a manager would be more likely to continue a failing project, and that project abandonment would have a greater negative impact on the manager's reputation concerns and future prospects at the firm, when R&D is capitalized. Consistent with capital market pressures identified in prior research, executives believe that abandoning a failing project would have a greater negative impact on stock price when R&D is capitalized, and they personally recommend continuing such a project in order to avoid missing the consensus analysts' forecast. These findings complement the experimental results in Seybert (2010), and while they replicate the survey results contained therein, they are not an endorsement of the veracity of the original survey data.
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Subject
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Accounting
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