Notas sobre Referência e Intencionalidade: Frege e Husserl

Abstract

Abstract This paper aims to present an approach to Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning in order to integrate meaning in the broader context of intentionality. Intentionality and reference are two notions with affinities, despite their pertaining to different but not separated areas. . . When comparing Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality we may provide a fruitful and enriching perspective: some problems and concepts of Husserl’s thought may be elucidated if confronted with those of Frege. On the other hand, Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality provide a broader and far-reaching scope to Frege’s ideas on meaning.. Husserl’s concept of intentionality provides a new perspective which allows to overcome some of the impasses of Frege’s theory of meaning.