1. Franz Brentano,Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (Leipzig, 1924), vol. 1, pp. 124–25.
2. Brentano held that an intentional situation is not strictlyrelational and suggested that, instead of calling it “relational,” we say that it involves “something relative” (Etwas Relativliches). Cf. Franz Brentano,Wahrheit and Evidenz, Oskar Kraus, ed., p. 195. He insisted in his later writings that there are no “unreal” or “inexistent” objects.Ibid., pp. 73–118, especially pp. 87–89. The point of the doctrine of intentionality is, not that there is a peculiar type of inexistent object, but that there is a peculiar type of psychic phenomenon.
3. The peculiar characteristics of intentional statements are discussed in the following works: G. Frege, “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung,” inZeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, n.s., 100:25–50 (1892), especially p. 31; reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds.,Readings in Philosophical Analysis. B. Russell, “Philosophy of Logical Atomism,”Monist, 29:32–63 (1918), especially pp. 47–63. G. E. Moore,Philosophical Studies, pp. 215–18. A. I. Melden, “Thought and Its Objects,”Philosophy of Science, 7:434–41. W. V. Quine, “Notes on Existence and Necessity,”Journal of Philosophy, 40:113–27 (1943). Hans Reichenbach,Elements of Symbolic Logic, pp. 274–84.
4. In connection with such cases, a linguistic criterion of intentionality may be useful as an instrument for revising a language.
5. B. Russell,An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 142.