An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Subjective Performance Assessments Versus Objective Performance Indicators as Determinants of CEO Compensation-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Subjective Performance Assessments Versus Objective Performance Indicators as Determinants of CEO Compensation

Published:2008-04 Issue:1 Volume:6 Page:7-25
ISSN:1536-5433
Container-title:Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
language:en
Short-container-title:Mgt Res: J of Iberoamer Ac Mgt

Author:

Caranikas‐Walker Fanny,Goel Sanjay,Gómez‐Mejía Luis R.,Cardy Robert L.,Grabke Rundell Arden

Publisher

Emerald

Subject

Strategy and Management,Business and International Management

Reference109 articles.

1. Multiple regression.

2. Performance Rating Validity: The Relationship of Objective and Subjective Measures of Performance

3. Leadership Instability in Hospitals: The Influence of Board-CEO Relations and Organizational Growth and Decline

4. Toward a contingency theory of compensation strategy

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