Empirical test of employee incentive in supply chain network based on asymmetric information game analysis and fuzzy model

Abstract

The construction of the evaluation index system of employee satisfaction level is the basis for an enterprise to measure the level of employee satisfaction. In this paper, the author analyzes the employee incentive in supply chain network based on asymmetric information game analysis and fuzzy model. Through the correction of network weight and threshold value, the error function decreases along the gradient direction. The construction and training of the network can be realized by MATLAB. The newff function in the software is used to construct the network, and the train function is used to train. This evaluation index system is a multi-level target evaluation system based on asymmetric information game, and its basic principle is to simplify complex problems. Long term effort is bigger when the salesperson’s risk averse parameter is more than a certain value or risk averse parameter is less but discount factor is more than a threshold; short term effort is bigger when risk averse parameter and discount factor is both less. For both information scenarios, the compensation contracts are designed and comparison analyses are conducted.