Author:
Yang Chun-Lei,Yue Ching-Syang Jack
Abstract
Abstract
Assortative matching (AM) can be theoretically an effective means to facilitate cooperation. We designed a controlled lab experiment with three treatments on multi-round prisoner’s dilemma. With matching based on weighted history (WH) as surrogate for AM, we show that adding pro-social dummies to the WH treatment may significantly improve cooperation, compared to both the random matching and the WH treatment. In society where assortative matching is effective and promoted by the underlying culture, institutional promotion of virtue role models can be interpreted as generating additional pro-social dummies, so as to move the initial state of cooperators into the basin of attraction for a highly cooperative polymorphic equilibrium.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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