Affiliation:
1. Humboldt University Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: )
Abstract
In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS—showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a particular threshold. I analyze individual strategies in four recent experiments to examine whether strategies are predictable, too. Behavior is well summarized by “Semi-Grim” strategies: cooperate after mutual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, randomize otherwise. This holds both in aggregate and individually, and it explains the BOS-threshold: Semi-Grim equilibria appear as the discount factor crosses this threshold, and then, subjects start cooperating in round 1 and switch to Semi-Grim in continuation play. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D12)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
39 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献