Evolution of cooperation on large networks with community structure

Abstract

Cooperation is a major factor in the evolution of human societies. The structure of social networks, which affects the dynamics of cooperation and other interpersonal phenomena, have common structural signatures. One of these signatures is the tendency to organize as groups. This tendency gives rise to networks with community structure, which are composed of distinct modules. In this paper, we study analytically the evolutionary game dynamics on large modular networks in the limit of weak selection. We obtain novel analytical conditions such that natural selection favours cooperation over defection. We calculate the transition point for each community to favour cooperation. We find that a critical inter-community link creation probability exists for given group density, such that the overall network supports cooperation even if individual communities inhibit it. As a byproduct, we present solutions for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio which perform with remarkable accuracy for diverse generative network models, including those with community structure and heavy-tailed degree distributions. We also demonstrate the generalizability of the results to arbitrary two-player games.