Leaders of war: modelling the evolution of conflict among heterogeneous groups

Abstract

War, in human and animal societies, can be extremely costly but can also offer significant benefits to the victorious group. We might expect groups to go into battle when the potential benefits of victory ( V ) outweigh the costs of escalated conflict ( C ); however, V and C are unlikely to be distributed evenly in heterogeneous groups. For example, some leaders who make the decision to go to war may monopolize the benefits at little cost to themselves (‘exploitative’ leaders). By contrast, other leaders may willingly pay increased costs, above and beyond their share of V (‘heroic’ leaders). We investigated conflict initiation and conflict participation in an ecological model where single-leader–multiple-follower groups came into conflict over natural resources. We found that small group size, low migration rate and frequent interaction between groups increased intergroup competition and the evolution of ‘exploitative’ leadership, while converse patterns favoured increased intragroup competition and the emergence of ‘heroic’ leaders. We also found evidence of an alternative leader/follower ‘shared effort’ outcome. Parameters that favoured high contributing ‘heroic’ leaders, and low contributing followers, facilitated transitions to more peaceful outcomes. We outline and discuss the key testable predictions of our model for empiricists studying intergroup conflict in humans and animals. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Intergroup conflict across taxa’.