Abstract
Processual and postprocessual archaeologists implicitly employ the same epistemological system to evaluate the worth of different explanations: inference to the best explanation. This is good since inference to the best explanation is the most effective epistemological approach to archaeological reasoning available. Underlying the logic of inference to the best explanation is the assumption that the explanation that accounts for the most evidence is also most likely to be true. This view of explanation often reflects the practice of archaeological reasoning better than either the hypothetico-deductive method or hermeneutics. This article explores the logic of inference to the best explanation and provides clear criteria to determine what makes one explanation better than another. Explanations that are empirically broad, general, modest, conservative, simple, testable, and address many perspectives are better than explanations that are not. This article also introduces a system of understanding explanation that emphasizes the role of contrastive pairings in the construction of specific explanations. This view of explanation allows for a better understanding of when, and when not, to engage in the testing of specific explanations.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Museology,Archaeology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),History
Cited by
57 articles.
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