An Evolutionary Game Model of the Supply Decisions between GNPOs and Hospitals during a Public Health Emergency

Abstract

The distribution of medical supplies tied to the government-owned nonprofit organizations (GNPOs) is crucial to the sustainable and high-quality development of emergency response to public health emergencies. This paper constructs a two-sided GNPO–hospital game model in a Chinese context, and explores the strategies and influencing factors of medical supply distribution in public health emergencies based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that: (1) GNPOs, as the distributor of medical supplies, should choose strategies that balance efficiency and equity as much as possible. (2) Hospitals, as the recipient of medical supplies, should actively choose strategies that maximize the total benefit to society and strengthen trust in GNPOs. Meanwhile, hospital managers need to pay attention to reducing the impact of communication and coordination costs and strive for the reduction of conflicts between different values. (3) The government should strengthen supervision to avoid conflicts between medical distributors and receivers during a public health emergency and ensure the rescue efficiency. This study provides some reference for the sustainable development of emergency relief in public health emergencies.