An Efficient and Secure Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks

Abstract

Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have become an essential part of the intelligent transportation system because they provide secure communication among vehicles, enhance vehicle safety, and improve the driving experience. However, due to the openness and vulnerability of wireless networks, the participating vehicles in a VANET system are prone to a variety of cyberattacks. To secure the privacy of vehicles and assure the authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation of messages, numerous signature schemes have been employed in the literature on VANETs. The majority of these solutions, however, are either not fully secured or entail high computational costs. To address the above issues and to enable secure communication between the vehicle and the roadside unit (RSU), we propose a certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme based on hyperelliptic curve cryptography (HECC). This scheme enables participating vehicles to share their identities with trusted authorities via an open wireless channel without revealing their identities to unauthorized participants. Another advantage of this approach is its capacity to release the partial private key to participating devices via an open wireless channel while keeping its identity secret from any other third parties. A provable security analysis through the random oracle model (ROM), which relies on the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, is performed, and we have proven that the proposed scheme is unforgeable against Type 1 (FGR1) and Type 2 (FGR2) forgers. The proposed scheme is compared with relevant schemes in terms of computational cost and communication overhead, and the results demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more efficient than the existing schemes in maintaining high-security levels.