Detection of Actuator Enablement Attacks by Petri Nets in Supervisory Control Systems

Abstract

The feedback control system with network-connected components is vulnerable to cyberattacks. We study a problem of attack detection in supervisory control of discrete-event systems. The scenario of a system subjected to actuator enablement attacks is considered in this article. We also consider that some unsafe places that should be protected from an attacker exist in the system, and some controllable events that are disabled by a supervisor might be re-enabled by an attacker. This article proposes a defense strategy to detect actuator enablement attacks and disable all controllable events after detecting an attack. We design algorithmic procedures to determine whether the system can be protected against damage caused by actuator enablement attacks, where the damage is predefined as a set of “unsafe” places. In this way, the system property is called “AE-safe controllability”. The safe controllability can be verified by using a basis diagnoser or a basis verifier. Finally, we explain the approach with a cargo system example.