Abstract
There is an increasing realization that industrial, large-scale agriculture can negatively impact both food quality and the environment, and that alternatives should be thoroughly considered. Consisting of various participants with distinct and often competing interests, organic food chains have a dynamic structure. We consider an evolutionary game theory model for the dynamics of an organic supply chain with farmers, their customers and the government as the main stakeholders. After describing stakeholder strategies and constructing appropriate payoff matrices for the interactions between farmers and customers and between farmers and the government, respectively, sufficient conditions for the stability of the equilibria for the associated replicator equations were found. Those conditions were then interpreted in practical terms, the corresponding possible outcomes being determined and numerically illustrated. It was seen that a sustainable shift from a conventional strategy to an organic one requires the efforts of all involved stakeholders. As far as the evolutionary interaction between farmers and customers is concerned, it was seen that the purchasing power and the organic awareness of customers are of the utmost importance for the establishment and diffusion of organic strategies in the supply chain. Furthermore, a situation in which the preferences of farmers and consumers for an organic (or conventional) strategy change periodically may occur. Regarding the evolutionary interaction between farmers and the government, strong support for organic farmers is needed at first, and then the consumption habits and environmental awareness of the consumers can be cultivated. This promotes the establishment, development and enrichment of an organic supply chain which, at a certain point, can persist even without governmental subsidies.
Funder
Chinese Ministry of Education
Jiangsu Province
Subject
General Mathematics,Engineering (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Cited by
7 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献