The Impact of FASB Staff Position APB 14-1 on Corporate Financing: A Debt Contracting Perspective

Abstract

Using a set of hand-collected data, we study the economic consequences of FASB Staff Position APB 14-1, which was adopted in 2008 and intended to increase reported interest expense and decrease reported leverage. First, we document that issuers are more likely to respond to APB 14-1 by reducing the outstanding amount of cash-settled convertible debt when they are more able to bear the cost of repurchase. Second, we explore the debt contracting explanations for issuers’ repurchase decisions. In particular, we focus on the contracting practice for GAAP changes and the inclusion of financial covenants related to interest coverage ratios. We find that issuers are less likely to repurchase the outstanding cash-settled convertibles when their bank loan contracts allow them to request a freeze on GAAP provisions to exclude mandatory GAAP changes in calculating accounting-based covenants. Further, when firms’ bank loan contracts contain financial covenants related to interest coverage ratios, issuers are more likely to repurchase outstanding cash-settled convertibles to avoid technical default due to the higher reported interest expense resulting from requirements under APB 14-1. These empirical results are consistent with the notion that firms do respond to mandatory GAAP changes when they are more able to afford the cost of such responses. Furthermore, debt contracting practices can help explain firms’ decisions to respond to mandatory GAAP changes.