Affiliation:
1. School of Information and Electrical Engineering, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan 056038, China
2. School of Information Engineering, Handan University, Handan 056038, China
Abstract
The existing research on dependent task offloading and resource allocation assumes that edge servers can provide computational and communication resources free of charge. This paper proposes a two-stage resource allocation method to address this issue. In the first stage, users incentivize edge servers to provide resources. We formulate the incentive problem in this stage as a multivariate Stackelberg game, which takes into account both computational and communication resources. In addition, we also analyze the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under information sharing conditions. Considering the privacy issues of the participants, the research is extended to scenarios without information sharing, where the multivariable game problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). In order to obtain the optimal incentive decision in this scenario, a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the learning game is designed. In the second stage, we propose a greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm that is aimed at minimizing task execution time by optimizing resource and task allocation strategies. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm designed for non-information sharing scenarios can effectively approximate the theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium, and its performance is found to be better than that of the other three benchmark methods. After the allocation of resources and sub-tasks by the greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm, the execution delay of the dependent task is significantly lower than that in local processing.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Hebei Natural Science Foundation
Subject
Computer Networks and Communications
Cited by
2 articles.
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