Abstract
In order to ensure stable cooperation among the government, enterprise and university/institute in the green technology innovation process and guide an increasing number of innovation agents in the region to adopt cooperation, this paper studies the mechanism of green technology innovation. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established and the strategy choices of the government, industry and university/institute are analyzed through mathematical derivation. On this basis, the cellular automata theory is used to explore strategy choices of all innovation agents in the region from the perspective of a spatial game. From the numerical tests, the following results are obtained: increasing the cooperative innovation revenue, fairness of this revenue distribution or penalties for breach of contract can consolidate the cooperative relationship among the government, enterprise and university/institute, achieving the goal of guiding all innovation agents in the region to accept the collaborative innovation mode; regulating the government subsidy or government penalty can consolidate the cooperative relationship among participants in the pilot project, but cannot guide all innovation agents in the region accept the collaboration innovation mode. This paper’s results not only enrich the theory of government–industry–university–institute collaborative innovation in green technology, but provide ideas for stable cooperation mechanisms and comprehensive promotion of this collaborative innovation mode as well.
Funder
National Social Science Foundation of China
Central Special Fund for scientific research in colleges and universities
Subject
Health, Toxicology and Mutagenesis,Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
Cited by
12 articles.
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