Research on the Governance form Mechanism of Platform Enterprise Monopoly Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Author:

Haixin Huang1,Wang Zhang1

Affiliation:

1. School of Economics and Management , Northwest University , Xi’an , , China .

Abstract

Abstract Platform enterprises, which aggregate numerous and scattered resources, connect multiple interdependent parties and facilitate interactions and transactions, also confront significant monopoly market challenges. These issues constrain the platform economy’s healthy development and severely disrupt the normal market order. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the government, platform enterprises, and users, to investigate the governance mechanisms of monopoly behavior in platform enterprises and employs Matlab for numerical simulation. The results indicate that government rewards, additional profits, monopoly penalties, and user collaboration positively impact the evolution of platform enterprise strategies toward non-monopolistic practices. Together, these four mechanisms constitute the governance mechanism for monopoly behavior in platform enterprises. Specifically, providing honorary rewards for non-monopolistic behavior in platform enterprises over a certain period is essential, as it represents an effective means for the government to encourage innovative development in internet platform enterprises. The profit mechanism is the main driving force behind platform enterprises adopting monopolistic strategies and facilitating their survival and development. To a certain extent, the penalty mechanism can suppress monopolistic behaviors in platform enterprises, but it cannot fundamentally eliminate them. Instead, this mechanism accelerates the evolution of platform enterprises towards non-monopolistic behaviors, marking it as a positive governance tool. The user collaboration mechanism, a form of collaborative governance, serves as a beneficial complement to the reward, penalty, and profit mechanisms. This is because users primarily engage with platforms as consumers, legally entitled to services, and their regulatory role constitutes only a part of their responsibilities, not the main economic activity on digital platforms.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Reference22 articles.

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