Optimal Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Cost Information-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Optimal Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Cost Information

Published:2020-06 Issue:6 Volume:146 Page:04020054
ISSN:0733-9364
Container-title:Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

Author:

Yao Min¹,Wang Fang²,Chen Zhiyuan³^ORCID,Ye Hanrui⁴

Affiliation:

1. Director and Senior Engineer, China Energy Group Ningxia Coal Industry Co. Ltd., Beijing St. No. 168, Yinchuan, Ningxia 750011, China.

2. Senior Economist, China Energy Group Ningxia Coal Industry Co. Ltd., Beijing St. No. 168, Yinchuan, Ningxia 750011, China.

3. Associate Professor, School of Economics and Management, Wuhan Univ., Bayi St. No. 299, Wuhan, Hubei 430072, China (corresponding author). ORCID: .

4. School of Economic and Management, Univ. of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhongguancun East St. No. 80, Beijing 100049, China.

Publisher

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

Subject

Strategy and Management,Industrial relations,Building and Construction,Civil and Structural Engineering

Link

http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0001832

Reference38 articles.

1. Construction Bidding Markup Estimation Using a Multistage Decision Theory Approach

2. Construction Bidding and the Winner’s Curse: Game Theory Approach

3. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism

4. Developing a Decision Support Tool for Nighttime Construction in Highway Projects

5. Incentive/Disincentive Contracts: Perceptions of Owners and Contractors

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