Post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocols against malicious adversaries

Abstract

SummarySecure two‐party computation allows a pair of parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Ultimately, each party receives only its own correct output. In this paper, a post‐quantum secure two‐party computation protocol is proposed that can be used to effectively block malicious parties. The protocol solves the problems of traditional protocols based on garbled circuits, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks, high communication costs and low computational efficiency. The input garbled keys of the circuit constructor is structured as a Learning with Error (LWE) equation, enabling the circuit constructor to employ a zero‐knowledge proof that demonstrates the uniformity of inputs across all circuits.In the key transfer phase, an LWE‐based batch single‐choice cut‐and‐choose oblivious transfer is proposed to avoid selective failure attacks. In addition, the protocol employs a penalty mechanism to detect if the circuit constructor has generated an incorrect circuit. We have compared the communication overhead of this protocol with three other secure two‐party computation protocols based on Cut‐and‐Choose technology. The analytical results show that this protocol has the best error probability and is resilient to quantum attacks under the malicious adversary model. In addition, with appropriate parameters, the protocol is able to reduce its communication bandwidth by an average of 40.41%.