Game Research on Coal Mine Workers’ Off-Post Behaviors

Abstract

In order to seek for causes and solutions of off-post behaviors of coal miners, static and evolutionary games were utilized on the basis of an established strategy simulation model between coal mine enterprise and coal miners. These games were used to determine the revenue matrix of two game parties given off-post behaviors of coal miners from two levels (coal miners and coal mine enterprise). Thus, equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary analyses of the two parties should be conducted. Results indicated that, in the enterprise’s perspective, inspection cost and punishment intensity are important factors that influence the safety production and economic benefit of coal mine enterprises; in the coal miners’ perspective, wage loss and the constraint degree it generates are essential factors. Furthermore, these factors constitute a key to solving off-post behaviors of coal miners. Reasonability of the established simulation model was analyzed and verified on the basis of off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine that belongs to Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. The coal mine enterprise should enhance the inspection of safety production and establish scientific and complete off-post punishment mechanism. Moreover, the coal mine enterprise should provide proper compensation, treatment, and reward policies of workers to reduce the off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine enterprise effectively.