A Thomistic Defense of Whole-Brain Death

Abstract

Michel Accad critiques the currently accepted whole-brain criterion for determining the death of a human being from a Thomistic metaphysical perspective and, in so doing, raises objections to a particular argument defending the whole-brain criterion by Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez. In this paper, I will respond to Accad's critique of the whole-brain criterion and defend its continued validity as a criterion for determining when a human being's death has occurred in accord with Thomistic metaphysical principles. I will, however, join Accad in criticizing Lee and Grisez's proposed defense of the whole-brain criterion as potentially leading to erroneous conclusions regarding the determination of human death. Lay summary Catholic physicians and bioethicists currently debate the legally accepted clinical standard for determining when a human being has died—known as the “wholebrain criterion”—which has also been morally affirmed by the Magisterium. This paper responds to physician Michel Accad's critique of the whole-brain criterion based upon St. Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical account of human nature as a union of a rational soul and a material body. I defend the whole-brain criterion from the same Thomistic philosophical perspective, while agreeing with Accad's objection to an alternative Thomistic defense of whole-brain death by philosophers Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez.