Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives

Published:2019-06-17 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Amanatidis Georgios¹,Kleer Pieter¹,Schäfer Guido²

Affiliation:

1. Centrum Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI), Amsterdam, Netherlands

2. Centrum Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI) & Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Funder

Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3328526.3329622

Reference44 articles.

1. Georgios Amanatidis Pieter Kleer and Guido Sch"a fer. 2019. Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online. CoRR Vol. abs/1905.00848 (2019). arxiv: 1905.00848 http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00848 Georgios Amanatidis Pieter Kleer and Guido Sch"a fer. 2019. Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online. CoRR Vol. abs/1905.00848 (2019). arxiv: 1905.00848 http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00848

2. Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

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