Randomized Pricing with Deferred Acceptance for Revenue Maximization with Submodular Objectives-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Randomized Pricing with Deferred Acceptance for Revenue Maximization with Submodular Objectives

Published:2023-04-30 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023
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Author:

Huang He¹^ORCID,Han Kai¹^ORCID,Cui Shuang²^ORCID,Tang Jing³^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. School of Computer Science and Technology, Soochow University, China

2. School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, China

3. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou), The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3543507.3583477

Reference45 articles.

1. Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design

2. Georgios Amanatidis , Georgios Birmpas , and Evangelos Markakis . 2017 . On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives. In International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). 1–15 . Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, and Evangelos Markakis. 2017. On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives. In International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). 1–15.

3. Georgios Amanatidis Federico Fusco Philip Lazos Stefano Leonardi and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. 2020. Fast adaptive non-monotone submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS). Georgios Amanatidis Federico Fusco Philip Lazos Stefano Leonardi and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. 2020. Fast adaptive non-monotone submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS).

4. Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives

5. Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

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