On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

Published:2021-07-18 Issue: Volume: Page:
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Container-title:Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Filos-Ratsikas Aris¹,Giannakopoulos Yiannis²,Hollender Alexandros³,Lazos Philip⁴,Poças Diogo⁵

Affiliation:

1. University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

2. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

3. University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

4. Sapienza Università di Roma, Rome, Italy

5. Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

Funder

Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

European Research Council

Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung

Publisher

ACM

Link

Reference70 articles.

3. Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated Strategic Interactions: An Introductory Survey;Battigalli Pierpaolo;Ricerche Economiche,1992

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3. Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules;Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing;2023-06-02

5. First Price Auction is 1 – 1 /e² Efficient;2022 IEEE 63rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS);2022-10