First Price Auction is 1-1/ <i>e</i> <sup>2</sup> Efficient-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

First Price Auction is 1-1/ e ² Efficient

Published:2023-10-14 Issue:5 Volume:70 Page:1-86
ISSN:0004-5411
Container-title:Journal of the ACM
language:en
Short-container-title:J. ACM

Author:

Jin Yaonan¹^ORCID,Lu Pinyan²^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Huawei TCS Lab, China

2. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Research of Computation and Economics (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics), & Huawei TCS Lab, China

Abstract

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/ e 2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

Funder

Science and Technology Innovation 2030

NSFC

Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission

Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Subject

Artificial Intelligence,Hardware and Architecture,Information Systems,Control and Systems Engineering,Software

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3617902

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