Affiliation:
1. Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
Abstract
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players
n
. Our main result states that for
n
-player binary-action games and for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in
n
. As a consequence of this result, we get an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Artificial Intelligence,Hardware and Architecture,Information Systems,Control and Systems Engineering,Software
Reference36 articles.
1. Yakov Babichenko and Siddharth Barman. 2013. Query complexity of correlated equilibrium. arXiv preprint arXiv:1306.2437 (2013). Yakov Babichenko and Siddharth Barman. 2013. Query complexity of correlated equilibrium. arXiv preprint arXiv:1306.2437 (2013).
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