Affiliation:
1. Czech Technical University in Prague
2. Hebrew University of Jerusalem
3. Aarhus University
4. IT-University of Copenhagen
Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (
the leader
) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (
the follower
) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Funder
Grantová Agentura České Republiky
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation
I-CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and The Israel Science Foundation
Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China
Danish Strategic Research Council
Israel Science Foundation
European Research Council
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Computational Mathematics,Marketing,Economics and Econometrics,Statistics and Probability,Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Cited by
7 articles.
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