Private Data Manipulation in Optimal Sponsored Search Auction-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Private Data Manipulation in Optimal Sponsored Search Auction

Published:2020-04-19 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020
language:
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Author:

Deng Xiaotie¹,Lin Tao¹,Xiao Tao²

Affiliation:

1. Peking University

2. Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3366423.3380023

Reference43 articles.

1. Kareem Amin Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed. 2013. Learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 1169–1177. Kareem Amin Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed. 2013. Learning prices for repeated auctions with strategic buyers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 1169–1177.

2. Kareem Amin Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed. 2014. Repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 622–630. Kareem Amin Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed. 2014. Repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 622–630.

3. An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

4. Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation

5. Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms

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