Learning to Bid in Revenue Maximizing Auction-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Learning to Bid in Revenue Maximizing Auction

Published:2019-05-13 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Companion Proceedings of The 2019 World Wide Web Conference
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Nedelec Thomas¹,El Karoui Noureddine²,Perchet Vianney³

Affiliation:

1. Criteo, ENS Paris Saclay

2. Criteo, UC, Berkeley

3. ENS Paris Saclay, Criteo

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3308560.3316527

Reference22 articles.

1. Marc Abeille Clément Calauzènes Noureddine El Karoui Thomas Nedelec and Vianney Perchet. 2018. Explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.00256. Marc Abeille Clément Calauzènes Noureddine El Karoui Thomas Nedelec and Vianney Perchet. 2018. Explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.00256.

2. Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees

3. Santiago R Balseiro Vahab S Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme. 2017. Dynamic mechanisms with martingale utilities. In Management Science. 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2872 Santiago R Balseiro Vahab S Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme. 2017. Dynamic mechanisms with martingale utilities. In Management Science. 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2872

4. The sample complexity of revenue maximization

Cited by 5 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties;Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024;2024-05-13

2. Private Data Manipulation in Sponsored Search Auctions;CAAI Artificial Intelligence Research;2023-12

3. Utility/privacy trade-off as regularized optimal transport;Mathematical Programming;2022-04-22

4. Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions;Algorithmic Game Theory;2022

5. Private Data Manipulation in Optimal Sponsored Search Auction;Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020;2020-04-19