Do independent directors inform the share of CSR criteria in executive compensation? Moderating effect of gender diversity

Abstract

AbstractThis paper extends and enriches the current research on CSR, CEO compensation contracts and characteristics of the board of directors by examining an underexplored question related to the potential impact of independent board members on the share of CSR criteria in executive compensation. It also considers a potential moderating effect of gender diversity in this relationship. Empirical analyses of a sample French firms listed on the SBF120 index between 2014 and 2021 show that independent directors have no impact on the inclusion of CSR criteria in the annual bonus of senior executives. They also reveal that gender diversity can strengthen the role of independent directors in indexing executive compensation to CSR criteria. The findings can be useful for corporate boards and policymakers seeking to boost the adoption of CSR criteria in executive compensation contracts. They provide empirical support for the Zimmermann law (2011) and urge the policymakers to boost the appointment of female directors on boards.