Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry
Author:
Affiliation:
1. Department of Strategy and Policy National University of Singapore
2. Department of Economics National University of Singapore
3. Economics Discipline Group, School of Business University of Technology Sydney
Funder
Ministry of Education - Singapore
Australian Research Council
Publisher
Wiley
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Link
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/caje.12190
Reference19 articles.
1. Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result
2. American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?
3. The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates
4. Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
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