The stability set as a social choice correspondence-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The stability set as a social choice correspondence

Published:2002-09 Issue:1 Volume:44 Page:91-113
ISSN:0165-4896
Container-title:Mathematical Social Sciences
language:en
Short-container-title:Mathematical Social Sciences

Author:

Martin Mathieu,Merlin Vincent

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,General Psychology,General Social Sciences,Sociology and Political Science

Reference40 articles.

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4. Gillies’ and Miller’s subrelations of a relation over an infinite set of alternatives: general results and applications to voting games;Bordes;Mathematics of Operations Research,1992

5. Far-sightedness and the voting paradox;Chakravorti;Journal of Economic Theory,1999

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