Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
Author:
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance
Reference21 articles.
1. Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts;Bajari;Rand Journal of Economics,2001
2. Cooperative investments and the value of contracting;Che;American Economic Review,1999
3. After you sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment;De Fraja;Games and Economic Behavior,1999
4. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure;Hart,1995
5. Foundations of incomplete contracts;Hart;Review of Eonomic Studies,1999
Cited by 14 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Hold-Up, Relational Contracting, and Reporting Bias;SSRN Electronic Journal;2024
2. Public credit institutions, export activities, and global value chain participation: Evidence from China's credit demonstration city construction program;Economic Modelling;2023-09
3. How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts;SSRN Electronic Journal;2022
4. On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries;Economics Letters;2021-05
5. Ex ante investment, ex post adaptation, and joint ownership;Economics Letters;2020-02
1.学者识别学者识别
2.学术分析学术分析
3.人才评估人才评估
"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线，采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统，可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容，当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种，收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇，并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询！咨询电话：010-8811{复制后删除}0370
www.globalauthorid.com
TOP
Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司 京公网安备11010802033243号 京ICP备18003416号-3