After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment

Published:1999-01 Issue:1 Volume:26 Page:22-39
ISSN:0899-8256
Container-title:Games and Economic Behavior
language:en
Short-container-title:Games and Economic Behavior

Author:

De Fraja Gianni

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference15 articles.

1. Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information;Aghion;Econometrica,1994

2. The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting;Bös;Scand. J. Econ.,1996

3. Che, Y.-K. Hausch, D. B. 1996, Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson, Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin, April

4. Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing;Chung;Rev. Econom. Stud.,1991

5. Dearden, J. A. Klotz, D. 1995, Investment Timing and Efficiency in Incomplete Contracts, Bethlehem, PA, Lehigh University

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