Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design

Published:2011-06 Issue:3 Volume:100 Page:538-555
ISSN:0304-405X
Container-title:Journal of Financial Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Financial Economics

Author:

Bizjak John,Lemmon Michael,Nguyen Thanh

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting

Reference19 articles.

1. Albuquerque, A., De Franco, G., Verdi, R., 2009. Peer choice in CEO compensation. Unpublished Working Paper, Boston University, University of Toronto, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2. Pay Without Performance: The Unfilled Promise of Executive Compensation;Bebchuk,2004

3. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?;Bizjak;Journal of Financial Economics,2008

4. The incentives of compensation consultants and CEO pay;Cadman;Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010

5. Cadman, B., Carter, M., 2009. Compensation peer groups and their relation with CEO pay. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Utah and Boston College.

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