Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

Published:2010-01 Issue:1 Volume:411 Page:174-187
ISSN:0304-3975
Container-title:Theoretical Computer Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Theoretical Computer Science

Author:

Li Xiang-Yang,Sun Zheng,Wang WeiZhao,Chu Xiaowen,Tang ShaoJie,Xu Ping

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

General Computer Science,Theoretical Computer Science

Reference21 articles.

1. E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation, in: Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS, 2004, pp. 295–304

2. Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing;Archer;Games and Economic Behavior,2004

3. A. Archer, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, E. Tardos, An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agent, in: Proceedings of the 14th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2003, pp. 205–214

4. A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem;Chvátal;Mathematics of Operation Research,1979

5. Multipart pricing of public goods;Clarke;Public Choice,1971

Cited by 10 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. A Game Theoretic Approach for a Minimal Secure Dominating Set;IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica;2023-12

2. Cost Allocation and Strategyproof Mechanism for Cover-set Games;Parallel Processing Letters;2023-08-08

3. A distributed algorithm for a set cover game;Discrete Mathematics, Algorithms and Applications;2021-05-24

4. A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set;Theoretical Computer Science;2020-10

5. Countermeasures Against False-Name Attacks on Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing;IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications;2017-02