Affiliation:
1. School of Mathematics and Physics, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, PR China
2. School of Mathematical Science & Institute of Mathematics, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, PR China
3. State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, PR China
Abstract
In this paper, we discuss several cost-sharing methods for cover-set games, for example, approximately budget-balanced, in the core, and/or strategyproof. Different from the traditional set cover game, in cover-set game, the elements stand for services, and each agent is both a service provider and receiver. In this study, for unselfish agents, we design a cost allocation method that can recover no less than [Formula: see text] fraction of the total cost, where [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] is the maximum number of receiving services among all agents. In addition, for agents who are selfish service providers with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, further, the total cost is no more than [Formula: see text] times that of an optimal solution.
Funder
Postgraduate Research & Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd
Subject
Hardware and Architecture,Theoretical Computer Science,Software