Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game

Published:2013-09 Issue: Volume:93 Page:205-218
ISSN:0167-2681
Container-title:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Author:

Angelova Vera,Regner Tobias

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics

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