Who Keeps Company with the Wolf will Learn to Howl: Does Local Corruption Culture Affect Financial Adviser Misconduct?

Abstract

AbstractMotivated by the increasing economic significance of investment advisory industries and the prevalence of wrongdoing in financial planning services, we examine whether, and to what extent, employee misconduct is shaped by their local corruption culture. Using novel data of more than 4.7 million adviser-year observations of financial advisers and the Department of Justice’s data on corruption, we find that financial advisers and advisory firms located in areas with higher levels of corruption are more likely to commit misconduct. These results hold for both individual advisor and firm level analyses and are robust to the use of various fixed effects, model specifications, proxies for corruption and misconduct, and an instrumental variable approach. Using the passage of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provision, which provides incentives for reporting corruption incidences and thereby reduces the incentives for fraud, we find that the relation between local corruption culture and adviser misconduct is attenuated after the provision enacted by the SEC. Overall, our study highlights the externalities of corruption culture on individual ethics and the essential role of whistleblowing laws in reducing corruption-prone norms.