Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis

Published:2009-05 Issue:1-2 Volume:70 Page:321-341
ISSN:0167-2681
Container-title:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Author:

Bolotova Yuliya V.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics

Reference40 articles.

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4. Bolotova, Y.V., 2006. Three essays on the effectiveness of overt collusion: Cartel overcharges, cartel stability and cartel success. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.

5. Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: an empirical analysis of food industry cartels;Bolotova;Agribusiness: An International Journal,2007

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