Personalism and the Trajectories of Populist Constitutions

Abstract

This article reassesses the relationship between populism, democracy, and constitutionalism in light of the strong tendency toward personalism that populism often carries. Populists who have taken power in recent years have often sought to carry out formal or informal constitutional changes. Whereas some of these changes have been celebrated as constitutional innovations, many have been viewed as threats to democracy. Focusing on examples from Latin America, this article shows that despite the stress populists put on constitutional change, the phenomenon remains tied to the charisma of individual leaders. Populist leaders go to great lengths to remain in office, and succession poses an acute regime crisis. A core task for constitutional design is incentivizing populist leaders to leave power, which is more likely to be achieved by channeling politics than by judicial fiat. If this can be accomplished, the ultimate legacy of populist constitutions may be more beneficial, and less harmful, than commonly thought.