The typology of agency models of corruption and the totalitarian corruption case

Abstract

The paper applies a typology of agency models of corruption, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the “ideal” preferences of society. The proposed approach has allowed to theoretically substantiate the existence of new models of corrupt behavior, quasi- and totalitarian corruption, and subsequently to reveal cases of such agents’ behavior in the public procurement practice. In conditions of inefficient regulation, developed by the mala fide principal, bona fide agents in an effort to best meet the needs of society may violate certain provisions of regulatory legal acts or regulatory policy principles (quasi-corruption) whilst the mala fide agents do the same things for bribes (efficient corruption). On the other hand, in some cases the agents have to act in accordance with the inefficient regulation, being deprived of the possibility to violate it (totalitarian corruption). In the paper, the discussion of assumptions of different models, presented in the typology, including quasi- and totalitarian corruption, has been found in the academic literature. The paper examines the hypothesis that the proposition of Russian single-source procurement regulation which directly restricts annual small purchasing of contracting authorities provokes totalitarian corrupt behavior of buyers making them use electronic reverse auctions instead of single-source procurement to award small contracts.