Learning to deal with dual use

Abstract

Biological research is profoundly valuable but can carry profound risks. The coronavirus outbreak reminds us of our vulnerability to biological threats and that research on pathogens is vital to threat mitigation. But such research can lead to catastrophic safety and security incidents. A global proliferation of tools and capabilities, driven by economic and national security interests, is also generating risks that fall outside current governance frameworks. We must learn to manage risks as quickly as we learn to manipulate life, but it remains unclear how well we are doing. One opportunity to learn is found in a new charge to the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which reconvened in January after a 2-year hiatus, to assess the effectiveness of U.S. dual-use research oversight policies. To meet the charge and suggest improvements, the NSABB must address a neglected need for an evidence base for adaptive risk management. Building this evidence base will require revisiting success criteria, creating data infrastructures, and fostering adaptive policies and testbeds.