A Theory of Corporate Boards with Endogenous Information Collection, Optimal Compensation and Strategic Voting: When Do Independent Boards Dominate Rubberstamping Ones?-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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A Theory of Corporate Boards with Endogenous Information Collection, Optimal Compensation and Strategic Voting: When Do Independent Boards Dominate Rubberstamping Ones?

Published:2008 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1556-5068
Container-title:SSRN Electronic Journal
language:en
Short-container-title:SSRN Journal

Author:

Fluck Zsuzsanna,Khanna Naveen

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Reference25 articles.

1. A Theory of Friendly Boards;Renee Adams;Journal of Finance,2005

2. Access, Common Agency, and Board Size

3. Entrenchment and Severence Pay in Optimal Governance Structures;A Almazan;Journal of Finance,2003

4. Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance

5. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ?;Revue d'économie financière;2012-06-01

2. Board Structure and Price Informativeness;SSRN Electronic Journal;2008

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