1. Assigning two tasks to one agent can be optimal if it mitigates the e�ect of the outside option. Similar, the e�ect of the outside option is the reason why ex-ante randomization can be pro?table. While we rarely observe contracts that include randomization, there exist many contracts which specify the allocation of tasks;of tasks and show that it can be optimal that the agent works on two tasks -even if they are very di�erent
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