Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
Author:
Affiliation:
1. Yale University
2. Stanford University
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics
Link
http://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-pdf/7/special_issue/24/34106633/7-special_issue-24.pdf
Cited by 3664 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Reluctance to pursue breakthrough research: A signaling explanation;Research Policy;2024-05
2. The interactive effects of performance evaluation leniency and performance measurement precision on employee effort and performance;Advances in Accounting;2024-03
3. Early childhood human capital formation at scale;Journal of Public Economics;2024-03
4. CEO turnovers due to poor industry performances: An examination of the boards’ retention criteria;Journal of Accounting and Public Policy;2024-03
5. ESG regulation and financial reporting quality: Friends or foes?;Finance Research Letters;2024-03
1.学者识别学者识别
2.学术分析学术分析
3.人才评估人才评估
"全球学者库"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前全球学者库共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370
www.globalauthorid.com
TOP
Copyright © 2019-2023 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司 京公网安备11010802033243号 京ICP备18003416号-3