An Analysis that Answers F.Y.Edgeworth's Question, Put to the Logicians and Philosophers Who Read the Journal <i>Mind</i>, Concerning the Importance of Evaluating the Role Played by Keynes's Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, C, in Decision Making-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An Analysis that Answers F.Y.Edgeworth's Question, Put to the Logicians and Philosophers Who Read the Journal Mind, Concerning the Importance of Evaluating the Role Played by Keynes's Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, C, in Decision Making

Published:2010 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1556-5068
Container-title:SSRN Electronic Journal
language:en
Short-container-title:SSRN Journal

Author:

Arthmar Rogério,Brady Michael Emmett

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Reference84 articles.

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4. An investigation of the laws of thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities / by George Boole.

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