Confusing Metaphors With Mathematics in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, When Analyzing Keynes’s Modeling of the Evidential Weight of the Argument V(a/H), Leads to confusion: If V(a/H)=W, As Defined in Chapter 26, Where 0≤w≤1, Then It Is Mathematically Impossible That Keynes’s Weight Is Monotonically Increasing
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Published:2018
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ISSN:1556-5068
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Container-title:SSRN Electronic Journal
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language:en
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Short-container-title:SSRN Journal
Author:
Brady Michael Emmett
Reference18 articles.
1. An Analysis that Answers F.Y.Edgeworth's Question, Put to the Logicians and Philosophers Who Read the Journal Mind, Concerning the Importance of Evaluating the Role Played by Keynes's Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, C, in Decision Making
2. Keynes's Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities: A Study of How Statisticians, Philosophers, Logicians, Historians, and Economists Failed to Comprehend Keynes's Breakthrough Application of G.Boole's Interval Approach to Probability in the 20th Century;Michael Brady;International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics,2012
3. Bertrand Russell on Keynes's A Treatise on Probability: What One Would Expect from the Twentieth Century's Greatest Philosopher
4. F. Y. Edgeworth on J. M. Keynes' A Treatise on Probability: The Mind and Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Reviews
5. Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and the Role of William Ernest Johnson in that Book;Michael Brady;John Maynard Keynes. Available at SSRN,1921